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This thesis was supposed to be only about cross ownership of firms, which was
reflected in the title of my research proposal “The consequences of cross-shareholding
for ownership structures and economic behavior”. The following quotation from this
proposal, written in May 2006, gives a brief description of my original research
intentions: “... this project aims at theoretically and empirically (i) constructing
and analyzing national and (inter-) regional frameworks of ownership structures,
(ii) quantifying the complex network of direct and indirect property relations, and
(iii) studying the implication of cross-shareholding for several topics in industrial
organization”. Of course, as is, in general, the case for the majority of PhD theses,
the current final output addresses only parts of the main issues in my proposal.
Other issues addressed in this thesis were not included in the proposal, and were
raised and investigated “along the way”.
It is obvious that interdependencies of any kind at very different levels (e.g.,
individuals, firms, industries, regions, countries) may have a crucial impact on
and implications for the activity of agents involved in such networks of bilateral
and multilateral interactions. Therefore, it is not surprising that economists devote
considerable attention to the complex interrelations between economic agents. As
mentioned above, the aim of this research was to analyze the consequences of cross
ownership of firms on their behavior and ownership structure. To give a simple
example that sketches the complex network of interdependent owners, suppose
that individual A owns a share in company B, which has a share in company C.
In its turn, firm C owns a share in B. A few readily observable implications of
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such shareholdings are the following. Although individual A has no direct inter-
est in C, there is an indirect relation via B. If the operating surplus (profits from
ordinary production) of C increases, A benefits through its shares in B. If the op-
erating surplus of B increases, A benefits not only directly but also indirectly (for
instance, via the gains in C that are beneficial to B again). It turns out that using
ownership distributions of private stockholders and companies, one can derive an
analytical framework that totally redistributes ownership from firms to the “real”
equityholders (e.g., individuals, the state, municipalities), which provides a basis
for evaluating the true ownership structure of an economy. As a result many inter-
esting questions arise: What is the value of the property embedded in shares that
real owners hold in companies? How to assess decision making power in the pres-
ence of complex ownership links between firms? What is the role of the state or
any other owner? What are the implications of firms’ cross ownership on control
power of shareholders, and does it have any impact on tacit collusive arrangements
of firms? What is the effect of cross-shareholding on prices, outputs, profits, and
social welfare? What happens if the structure of cross-shareholding changes? And
many more.
While studying these issues, I came across the paper by Ballester et al. (2006)
on finding a key player in social networks, where the key player exerts the largest
impact on the overall (equilibrium) activity of the network.1 This important study
raised some related questions to me, focusing on which ultimately resulted in two
papers that constitute two chapters (5 and 6) of this thesis. By doing so I also
crossed the borders of my original research plan, from topics mainly in Industrial
Organization to issues in such fields as Network Economics, Interindustry Eco-
nomics and Social Network Analysis. In what follows these issues will be discussed
in more detail.
1.2 Industrial organization and finance
Often it is argued that Continental Europe and Japan have an enterprise oriented
system of ownership structure, while the Anglo-American system is market ori-
ented. One of the important factors in determining such orientation of the own-
ership structure of an economy is the presence or absence of complex webs of in-
tercorporate holdings. These are believed to play a prominent role in Continental
1 I would like to thank Jose´ Luis Moraga-Gonza´lez for bringing this paper to my attention, and the
industrial organization reading group of the University of Groningen, led by Marco Haan, that made
me to delve deeper into the topic.
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Europe and Japan. The question is how this ownership complexity can be quanti-
fied (which was, in fact, the second point of my original research proposal). Chap-
ter 2 focuses on this issue, where two types of owners are distinguished: primary
owners that own intermediary institutions but cannot be owned themselves (e.g.,
individuals, the state, municipalities), and secondary owners that can own other
intermediary institutions but are surely owned themselves by other owners (e.g.,
companies, banks, industrial corporations). In quantifying ownership interrelated-
ness both the size of direct and indirect shareholdings and the “average distance”
between primary owners and secondary owners are taken into account. The latter
is obtained from the average number of secondary owners via whom ownership
links between primary owners and secondary owners run. Combining the link-
age size and the distance allows us to visualize the cross-shareholding interlocks
and the true ownership relations in an industry (economy). The methodology is
applied to the banking sector in the Czech Republic, where the complexity of the
network of relations between primary and secondary owners are quantified, and
the relevant shareholding chains are graphed.
Chapter 2 further explores the link between the proposed measures of own-
ership network complexity and the degree of separation of dividend and control
rights, widely studied in the finance literature. To give an idea of the issue at stake,
suppose we have the following ownership chain: A → B → C. That is, firm A
owns a share in firm B, which in its turn owns a share in company C. Hence,
although the dividend rights of A in firm C are zero, there is an indirect owner-
ship connection via B that makes it possible for firm A to have positive control
rights in C (which may be very large depending of the size of these direct share-
holdings). Thus, it is not surprising that there are ample studies in Finance that
focus on the issue of separation of ownership and control rights due to pyramid-
ing ownership structures and cross-holdings. It is obvious that in the presence of
mutual cross-shareholdings the chains of ownership stakes are not at all easy to
trace. Thus, quantifying the control power embedded in such complex ownership
networks is also far from trivial. For example, using the well-known “weakest
link” methodology that defines the minimum stake along the ownership chain as
the corresponding control right is simply unpractical. This is because in the pres-
ence of cross-shareholdings there exists an infinite number of ownership paths of
different lengths. On the other hand, our proposed measures of ownership com-
plexity fully take into account such means of enhancing control as non-pyramidal
cross ownership links, where also the sizes of shareholdings and distances between
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owners are explicitly accounted for. Hence, we consider these indicators as alter-
native measures of the separation of ownership and control rights. That is, the
more complex the network of non-negligible relations is, the larger is the degree of
control enhancement due to cross-shareholding links among firms. Therefore, also
the difference between the control and the ownership stakes of primary owners in
secondary owners is larger. The empirical results confirm this for the Czech bank-
ing sector, where the results are compared to the “weakest link” and “dominant
shareholder” approaches of identifying control rights.
In reality, shareholdings are often silent (or partial) by their nature, meaning that
they do not give control power for their owners. However, as partial cross owner-
ship (PCO) results in commonality of interests of firms engaged in such sharehold-
ing interlocks, it is interesting to investigate what are the effects of PCO on the
market performance and market power of the individual firms in an industry. This
is the subject of study in Chapter 3. For this purpose we modify the well-known
framework of the “structure-conduct-performance paradigm” for estimating firms’
market power and the degree of tacit collusion inherent to the market by consider-
ing both direct and indirect PCO holdings among firms. It is shown that, unlike in
the no-PCO case, the link between firms’ price-cost margins and the degree of tacit
collusion is nonlinear in the presence of PCO. Thus, if PCO is present, ignoring it
will most likely lead to biased results due to model misspecification. The modified
framework is applied to the Japanese banking sector in 2003. We find that Japanese
banks compete in a modest collusive environment. If, however, PCO is neglected,
the results indicate a Cournot oligopoly. Further, it is shown that banks with pas-
sive holdings in rivals exert a strictly larger market power than those without any
PCO. In particular, city banks with many shareholdings are found to exercise a
much larger market power than regional banks with none or few stockholdings.
Hence, the hypothesis is confirmed that acquiring shares in rivals is one of the cru-
cial means for a firm to enhance its market power.
Passive investments of firms in rivals were either granted a de facto exemption
from antitrust liability or have gone unchallenged by antitrust agencies in recent
cases. However, recently Gilo et al. (2006) showed that there are cases in which
PCO arrangements can facilitate tacit collusion among rival firms, hence such a le-
nient approach towards passive investments in rivals may bemisguided. However,
Gilo et al. (2006) assumed that firms are symmetric and have the samemarginal cost
functions. Chapter 4 relaxes this assumption and examines the effect of PCO on the
incentives of asymmetric firms to collude. Unlike Chapter 3, which studies some-
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what similar issues in a one-period conjectural variations setting, Chapter 4 posits
an infinitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly model. We first consider the case where
only the most efficient firm in the industry invests in rivals. Since there are no other
firms involved in partial ownership acquisition, we refer to this case as partial own-
ership (PO) case. (PCO, on the other hand, indicates that more than one firm are
involved in stockholdings, thus could mutual shareholdings are possible.) It is
shown that even unilateral partial ownership by this firm may facilitate a market-
sharing scheme in which all firms charge the same collusive price and divide the
market between them. Unlike the case where firms have the same marginal costs,
here firms have different monopoly prices on which they wish to collude, and the
collusive price is assumed to be a compromise between the monopoly prices of the
different firms. We show that when the most efficient firm invests in rivals, the
collusive price increases relative to the case where there are no PO arrangements.
Further, Chapter 4 shows that in the case of multilateral PCO arrangements an
increase in the stake that firm r holds in firm swill never hinder collusion and it will
strictly facilitate collusion if and only if (i) the industry maverick (the firm with the
strongest incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement) has a direct or indirect
stake in firm r, and (ii) firm s is not the industrymaverick. When either (i) or (ii) fails
to hold, the increase in firm r’s stake in firm s does not affect tacit collusion. These
results extend the earlier findings in Gilo et al. (2006) and show that the results
for firms with symmetric cost functions generalize to the asymmetric costs case.
Then Chapter 4 investigates the effect of a transfer of PCO between firms on tacit
collusion, and shows that depending on the initial structure of shareholdings of
firms directly involved in the ownership transfer, tacit collusion may be facilitated,
be hindered, or remain unchanged.
1.3 The link to network economics and social network
analysis
In the sociology literature, the problem of identifying the most important actors in
social networks has been studied extensively, and still remains an essential topic
of concern. In particular, within the field of Social Network Analysis a vast num-
ber of indicators, the so-called network centralities, have been proposed in order
to identify key actors in networks. For example, the best-known and most often
used measures are centralities of degree, closeness, betweenness, information, Katz
status measure, and Bonacich centrality (see e.g., Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pp.
6 Chapter 1
169-219).
A similar problem from an economic perspective was first analyzed by Ballester
et al. (2006), who introduce a network game, where actors’ payoffs depend on each
other through network embeddedness. Players choose a level of activity in a game
with negative global externalities (e.g., competition) and local positive externali-
ties (e.g., learning, collaboration) that come through the network. Obviously, such
system has feedback effects, which are taken into account in the Nash equilibrium
activity levels that are dependent on the underlying network topology. The au-
thors show that individual equilibrium levels of agents are proportional to their
Katz-Bonacich centrality measures. Hence, they provide a behavioral foundation to
the status measure of Katz (1953) and the network centrality measure of Bonacich
(1987). However, these measures are not sufficient to identify a key player – the
player with the largest impact on the overall equilibrium outcome. Hence, Ballester
et al. (2006) propose a new measure of network centrality, named the intercentrality
measure, that is derived from the planner’s optimization concern. Since it inter-
nalizes all the network payoff externalities of agents, the intercentrality measure
identifies the key player.
Chapter 5 considers a more general setting of finding a key group in such net-
work games, and also takes explicitly players’ ex ante heterogeneity into account.
Similar to the key player definition, the key group is a group of players that ex-
ert the maximum possible impact on the overall equilibrium activity level of the
network. It should be noted that the assumption of ex ante identical players in
the search of a key player used in Ballester et al. (2006) is quite restrictive from a
practical point of view, because in that case all observable differences between in-
dividuals are ignored. These heterogeneity factors include, for example, a player’s
age, education, occupation, race, gender, parents education, or family size. We
show that once this exogenous heterogeneity is accounted for, the results of the key
player/group problem may change dramatically. In searching for the key group
we make use of weighted and unweighted Katz-Bonachich (KB) centralities and
group intercentrality measures, where the weights are the observable differences of
the players.
Chapter 5 also endogenizes the size of the key group. The need for such endo-
genization arises because in reality targeting a certain set of players also incurs
costs, next to benefits. In a majority of cases, these benefits and costs are directly re-
lated to the group size. As an example, suppose that a planner wants to maximally
disrupt the functioning of a network of criminals in some location. It is obvious that
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the larger the size of the key group of criminals is, the larger is the benefit in terms
of reducing criminal activity in this society. However, there are costs involved in
the “elimination” of criminals, such as costs related to gathering information, time,
hiring people, and other costs for planning and implementation of such an anni-
hilating aim. All these costs are generally higher for a larger key group. We show
that within the class of network games studied in Ballester et al. (2006) the op-
timal size of the key group is determined by the minimal key group loss measure
that depends on players’ weighted and unweighted KB centralities and key group
intercentralities, and the costs of group targeting.
1.4 Interindustry economics and game theory
The key group problem within the network games discussed in the previous sec-
tion has a close relation (at least, technically) to the problem of finding key sectors
in the framework of input-output (IO) linkage analysis. Key sectors are the indus-
tries with the largest potential of spreading growth impulses throughout the econ-
omy. There are several methods for identifying key sectors in Interindustry Eco-
nomics, but for our purposes we focus on the hypothetical extraction method (HEM)
developed in the 1960s, which is extensively used in the IO literature. The HEM
in identifying key sectors measures the importance of industries in terms of their
contribution to the overall gross output of an economy by extracting them from the
production structure. We show that this approach is similar to that of finding the
key player in a social network in Network Economics and Social Network Anal-
ysis, where players are eliminated from the network of local interactions, which
enables one to quantify these players’ marginal contribution to the overall activity
level and/or network functioning.
The main contribution of Chapter 6 to the literature on key sectors identification
from the HEM perspective is that it distinguishes between and explicitly formulates
the optimization problems of finding a key sector and a key group of sectors, and de-
rives analytical solutions for these problems in terms of simple measures called
industries’ factor worths. The term “factor” refers to any indicator that is of interest
in identifying the most important industries. This might be any social, environ-
mental, and/or economic factor (e.g., employment, water use, GDP, etc.), or any
combination of these factors. Our formal formulation of the HEM problems has
several important implications, one of which is that the key group of k > 1 sec-
tors is, in general, different from the set of top k sectors with the largest individual
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contributions to the overall factor production/consumption. This is confirmed in
the empirical application of the key sector and the key group problems to the Aus-
tralian economy in case of water use and CO2 emissions. This (expected) finding is
important, since up to date, to the best of our knowledge, the linkage literature (im-
plicitly) accepted the top k sectors (selected on the basis of the key sector problem)
as the key group. Technically speaking, this incongruence is due to the fact that
while the key sector problem looks for the effect of the (hypothetical) extraction of
one sector, the key group problem considers the effect of a simultaneous extraction
of k ≥ 2 sectors that takes differently into account the cross-contributions of the
extracted industries to total factor arising within and outside the group. Its eco-
nomic interpretation has to do with what sociologists call the redundancy principle
(see e.g., Burt, 1992). In the IO framework, this means that sectors might be redun-
dant with respect to each other if they have similar patterns of production linkages
with other industries, and similar structures of final demand and factor generation
capabilities. Hence, the optimal target should consist of rather nonredundant sec-
tors that have different patterns of (significant) interindustry linkages and factor
generation ability. Therefore, which sectors will be part of the key group is largely
dependent on the (dis)similarity of the production linkage patterns of sectors to
each other and of their final demand and factor generation structures. At this point
we have to mention that the redundancy principle also plays an important role in
identifying the key group of players within the network games that are discussed
in detail in Chapter 5.
Revealing the connection of the HEM to the well-known fields of influence ap-
proach in the IO literature (Sonis and Hewings 1989, 1992) gives an alternative
economic interpretation of the HEM problems in terms of the overall impact on
aggregate factor generation due to an incremental change in sectors’ input self-
dependencies. Further, we explore the related issues of finding the key region and
the key group of regions in an interregional IO setting, and discuss the effect of net-
ting out (nullifying) the intrasectoral transactions on industries’ (or regions’) factor
worths. Also discussed in Chapter 6 is the link of the (generalized) HEM approach
of finding the key sector to the coalitional game literature on fair allocation of gains
from cooperation. In particular, the properties (axioms) of the well-known Shap-
ley value are given, and it is elaborated whether these properties also hold for the
industry’s factor worth. Hence, there is also a connection to Game Theory, and to
measuring the power of players, in particular.
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1.5 Outline of the study
A rough sketch of the present study is presented in Figure 1.1. As mentioned in
the previous sections, the interdependencies that we are interested in are of three
types, namely, cross ownership (or shareholding interlocks) of firms, social net-
works, and intersectoral relations. Obviously, since these interrelationships are dif-
ferent in their own nature, the analytical frameworks that are used in their anal-
ysis are also different. Hence, there are several well-established and seemingly
independent fields of economics and sociology that are the focus of this study. As
discussed in some detail in the previous sections these are Finance, Industrial Orga-
nization, Network Economics, Social Network Analysis, Interindustry Economics,
and Game Theory.
It is worth noting, however, that all the issues considered in this work are closely
related, because in the end the analysis boils down to focusing on all kinds of im-
pacts due to the presence of the complex networks of linkages between firms, in-
dividuals, and/or sectors of an economy. Moreover, the mathematical techniques
developed for one type of analysis (say, in Interindustry Economics) can be read-
ily used to address related issues in the other fields (e.g., Industrial Organization,
Network Economics). For example, the well-known open Leontief model in Input-
Output Analysis, which is capable of quantifying both direct and indirect sectoral
relations in an economy, is quite useful in modeling and analyzing cross owner-
ship links of firms and easily allows to distinguish between the direct and indirect
shareholdings. As will be discussed in the text this setting has important theoret-
ical and practical implications. Similarly, our Lemmas 5.1 and 6.2 that are in fact
mathematically equivalent, are the building blocks of the studies in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. Thus, they directly connect the analysis of key players search in net-
work games and key sectors identification in an input-output setting. Therefore,
this thesis in fact shows that the above mentioned fields are not totally indepen-
dent of each other, but are closely related, at least, when the focus is the analysis of
interdependencies.
Some main issues of each chapter are also given Figure 1.1. For example, one
of the main aims of Chapter 5 is the study of the problem of identifying key group
of players in social networks, where the observable differences (or exogenous het-
erogeneity) of individuals are taken into account. This links our study to the Net-
work Economics’ topics on network games. But since in the course of this analysis
such important sociology notions as centrality measures and redundancy principle
play a crucial role, there is also a close relation to the Social Network Analysis of
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finding the most important actors in networks. Similarly, Chapter 6 extends the
traditional hypothetical extraction method (HEM) in Interindustry Economics in
finding a key sector with the maximum potential of spreading total output growth
impulses throughout the economy to the problem of identifying a key group of
sectors with the highest economy-wide impact on factor generation/consumption.
This generalized HEM is then linked to another widely used approach in the same
field, namely, the fields of influence method, which will be also discussed in detail
in the chapter. The solutions of the HEM problems have direct connection to the
intercentrality measures (discussed in Chapter 5) and the so-called Shapley value
in the coalitional game literature. The Shapley value identifies the worth (or impor-
tance) of each participant of the coalition to its functioning. In this way, Chapter 6
also discusses briefly this link to Game Theory.
1.6 Some general notations
Due to the nature of our study, matrix algebra will be extensively used throughout
the book. Therefore, it makes sense to introduce some important notations at this
point.
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Vectors and matrices. Adopting usual convention, matrices are given in bold, capital
letters (e.g., X); vectors in bold, lower case letters (e.g., x); and scalars in italicized,
lower case letters (e.g., x). Vectors are columns by definition, thus row vectors
are obtained by transposition, indicated by a prime (e.g., x′). xˆ denotes the n × n
diagonal matrix with the elements of the vector x on its main diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. The zero matrix and the zero vector are, respectively, denoted byO and
0. The summation vector ı consists of ones, i.e., ı′ = (1 1 · · · 1).
Matrix (and vector) inequalities. The following notation for inequalities between ma-
trices (and vectors) is adopted.
X ≤ Ymeans xij ≤ yij for all i and all j;
X < Y means X ≤ Y, but X 6= Y, i.e., xij ≤ yij for all i, j, with at least one strict
inequality;
X Y implies xij < yij for all i and all j.

